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August     Last updated: August 12  5:00 p.m.

 The writer seeks to correct this imbalance. ...The writer is highly critical of armed forces policy under Mr Nehru who was “convinced that the age when one country invaded another was long past”. As a result of such thoughtless thinking “China could not be regarded as our enemy. We could not name Pakistan as an enemy because that would have alienated the feelings of Muslims in the country. The result was that the training of the officers of the Indian army remained lifeless and aimless.” It was obvious to the GoI that the Chinese might start trouble in Ladakh. It was also obvious that the Indian units were destined to face reverses here. However, a bright side of the picture was that the top officers here like Lt. Gen. Daulat Singh and Lt. Gen. Bikram Singh were real professional soldiers and not over-promoted loyalists.

Quite unlike in Nefa, they formed a team that worked well and harmoniously. The seniors trusted their juniors and vice versa. But this team worked underserious handicaps. They were neither adequate in numbers nor properly equipped. The Western Command had submitted a report to the GoI but nothing came out of it till the Chinese attack. Then they were asked to stop the enemy intrusions “without provoking the Chinese or attacking their posts, keeping 200 yards away from Chinese-held ground. “They were to occupy as much territory as possible to prove India's possession.” So the army was put in the funny position of occupying its own land irrespective of tactical considerations, that is, performing the task of the Indian police.

To carry out such orders from Delhi, groups of Indian jawans were sent or flown to establish and maintain out-posts in isolated corners. But these posts could only be thinly held. Isolation on high altitudes added to the difficulty of the troops. Such dispersal was never approved of by the army commanders on the spot.

 On the other hand, the Chinese had constructed a network of roads inter-linking all their posts which were established on dominating ground all along the India-China boundary as they believed it to be. Only lower heights were left for the Indian troops with a few exceptions and that is where the fiercest clashes took place. ...The Indian commanders in Ladakh were more sensible than those in Nefa. They did not rush “to throw the Chinese out of the territory” as they knew their limitations.

 Withdrawals, whenever necessary, were orderly. They did not sacrifice their units unnecessarily and saved as much of their heavy equipment as possible. The writer says that though defeat was writ large in both the areas, there is no cause to believe that the Ladakh debacle was of the same magnitude as that in Nefa. As he puts it: “The Indian lost the Srijap and the Rezang La battles but their defeat, judging by any standard, was not less than a glorious victory. It checked the Chinese from attacking the Chushul air field. ...

                                                                                                             August 8, 1970